Contract over Target Baseline (OTB) Effect on Earned Value Management\u27s Cost Performance Index (CPI) by Jack, Dennis E.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
6-17-2010
Contract over Target Baseline (OTB) Effect on
Earned Value Management's Cost Performance
Index (CPI)
Dennis E. Jack
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Operations and Supply Chain Management
Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jack, Dennis E., "Contract over Target Baseline (OTB) Effect on Earned Value Management's Cost Performance Index (CPI)" (2010).
Theses and Dissertations. 2154.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/2154
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTRACT OVER TARGET BASELINE (OTB) EFFECT 
ON EARNED VALUE MANAGEMENT’S COST 
PERFORMANCE INDEX (CPI) 
 
THESIS 
 
Dennis E. Jack, Major, USAF 
AFIT/GCA/ENC/10-02 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
AFIT/GCA/ENC/10-02 
 
 
 
CONTRACT OVER TARGET BASELINE (OTB) EFFECT ON EARNED VALUE 
MANAGEMENT’S COST PERFORMANCE INDEX (CPI) 
 
THESIS 
Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Mathematics and Statistics 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science in Cost Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Dennis E. Jack, BA, MBA 
 
Major, USAF 
 
 
June 2010 
 
 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
AFIT/GCA/ENC/10-02 
 
 
 
 
CONTRACT OVER TARGET BASELINE (OTB) EFFECT ON EARNED VALUE 
MANAGEMENT’S COST PERFORMANCE INDEX (CPI) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dennis E. Jack, BA, MBA 
Major, USAF 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Approved: 
 
 
  
          _______________________________   __________________ 
          Edward D. White (Chairman)     Date 
  
 
 
          _______________________________   __________________ 
          Lt Col Eric J. Unger (Member)    Date 
  
  
 
          ______________________________    __________________ 
          Lt Col Joseph R. Wirthlin (Member)    Date 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
AFIT/GCA/ENC/10-02 
Abstract 
 
  Cost growth is a problem in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions.  A 
particular component of cost growth is a cost overrun or Over Target Baseline (OTB).  In 
2009, Trahan found that the Gompertz growth curve better predicted program Estimates 
at Completion (EAC) for OTB contracts.   In 2010, Thickstun studied “the relationships 
between overruns and a variety of factors,” but found OTB occurrences “random” and 
questioned the benefit of the OTB process (Thickstun, 2010).  In this research, we study 
OTB‟s ability to effect improved program cost performance; we examine OTB‟s effect 
on the cumulative Cost Performance Index (CPI) slope after an OTB intervention.  We 
find there is no statistically significant change in cumulative CPI slope after OTB.  For 
the data studied, an OTB investment does not significantly improve management‟s ability 
to earn cost value as reflected in the cumulative CPI slope.    
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CONTRACT OVER TARGET BASELINE (OTB) EFFECT ON EARNED VALUE 
MANAGEMENT’S COST PERFORMANCE INDEX (CPI) 
 
I:  Introduction 
Background 
The U.S. Department of Defense and our Nation face a timeless challenge:  match 
finite financial resources to prioritized joint-capability requirements while earning the 
greatest capability value per acquisition dollar spent.  The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has rated the Department of Defense‟s (DoD) Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS) as a “high-risk” area since 1990 for its costly and  
“fragmented” approach to identifying and acquiring materiel solutions to meet joint 
defense capability requirements (GAO, 2009).   
The inability to acquire joint defense capabilities at contracted costs and within 
scheduled timeframes is a continuing DoD problem.  As reported in fiscal year 2008 
dollars (Table 1), the DOD‟s estimated total acquisition cost growth relating to its 
investment in 95 major defense programs is $295 billion; this cost growth is accompanied 
by an average schedule delay in delivering initial capabilities of 21 months (GAO, 2008). 
      
 Table 1:  Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (GAO-08-604CG)  
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A particular subcomponent of cost growth is a cost overrun or Over Target 
Baseline (OTB) contract; essentially, an OTB reflects a contractor‟s inability to produce a 
required capability at a specified contracted cost.  Further, OTB signifies management‟s 
decision to establish a new Earned Value Management (EVM) Performance 
Measurement Baseline (PMB) “to improve managerial control over the execution of the 
remaining work in a project” (DAU, 2007).  OTB is a very detailed, ten-step process that 
requires active commitment from all acquisition stakeholders assigned to that contract 
effort.  Per the DAU guidebook, the OTB motto is “Do it once!  Do it right!” (DAU, 
2007).   
In 2009, Trahan found that nonlinear growth modeling, specifically the Gompertz 
growth curve, better predicted program Estimates at Completion (EAC) for OTB 
contracts (Trahan, 2009).   In 2010, Thickstun attempted to complement Trahan‟s 
research by producing an OTB prediction model based on logistic regression and found 
that OTB is a random occurrence for the data studied and questioned the value of the 
OTB process (Thickstun, 2010).  Thickstun reports that “there have been over $17 billion 
in cost overruns related to OTBs since 2000” and for the dataset studied, “approximately 
twenty percent of all acquisition contracts in the DoD experienced cost overruns over the 
past 20 years” (Thickstun, 2010).     
 At the contract level, internal control aimed at producing program-level decision 
support was instituted by the DoD decades ago.   Since the 1960‟s, the DoD has required 
major defense acquisition contractors to comply with Earned Value Management (EVM) 
standards and financial reporting as a means to control cost, schedule and performance 
(Fleming, 2000).  The Cost Performance Index (CPI) is a critical EVM cost performance 
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metric.  The CPI is not only a measure of cost performance health, it is a statistic utilized 
in predicting a program's Estimate at Completion (EAC).  For its importance, the CPI has 
been a critical topic of academic research centered on EAC methods and CPI heuristics.  
In 2008, Henderson states “the widely reported CPI stability rule cannot be generalized 
even within the US Defense Department (US DoD) project portfolio” and referring to the 
goal of improving project performance, “an understanding of project characteristics, 
which result in progressively improving CPI would, if these characteristics could be 
emulated in other programs, be an extremely useful advance to practice” (Henderson, 
2008).  Identifying specific PM actions that improve the cumulative CPI, correspondingly 
increasing the value of the cumulative CPI slope, is the goal of our research.       
As it relates to the CPI, an OTB intervention typically removes any cost variance 
associated with contract performance and resets the CPI to a value of one.  Given the CPI 
is reset to one, the only method of determining OTB effectiveness on the CPI is to study 
the cumulative CPI trend or the cumulative CPI slope after OTB.  The cumulative CPI 
slope change (comparing slopes before and after OTB) provides a generic measurement 
that can be examined for all types of programs regardless of technical risk, appropriation 
and programmatic content.  The goal of OTB is to improve managerial control of a 
project's remaining work in terms of cost, schedule and performance; if effective, OTB 
should increase the cumulative CPI slope.  
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Purpose 
  
Given “the DoD is entrusted with more taxpayer dollars than any other federal 
agency", it is incumbent upon management (at the enterprise and program levels) to 
identify and implement management actions that produce improved acquisition outcomes 
(GAO, 2009).  Our research attempts to identify program management actions that 
produce a positive managerial cost effect; specifically, we examine OTB process actions 
(treatment) for a positive effect on the rate of earning cost value as measured by the 
cumulative CPI slope after OTB. 
 
Research Questions and Methodology 
 
Our research aims to answer the following questions:  
 
1)  Does the OTB process (treatment) improve the cumulative CPI's rate of 
change (cumulative CPI slope) after OTB? 
2)  Is the cumulative CPI slope after OTB sensitive to time and/or programmatic 
factors to include contract type, military service and the purpose of the appropriation? 
 
To answer these questions, we examine the cumulative CPI rate of change, the 
slope of the line created by cumulative CPI data points before and after OTB.    Similar to 
past OTB and EVM research, the DoD Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) 
database is the source of our data.  Cumulative CPI is not distributed normally, therefore, 
we utilize a nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney Test) to determine whether there is a 
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statistically significant difference in the cumulative CPI slopes before and after OTB, 
which we describe in Chapter 3.       
 
Chapter Summary   
  
 OTB seeks to gain managerial control over remaining work in terms of cost, 
schedule and performance.  Earning greater capability value for every dollar spent is a 
timeless challenge that cuts across every DoD acquisition program regardless of life cycle 
stage, platform and program risk.  As stewards of taxpayer funds, the DoD should exploit 
acquisition actions that produce improved cost, schedule and performance outcomes and 
divest itself of acquisition actions that fail to produce the same.  Chapter II provides a 
review of past research concerning EVM and OTB.  In Chapter III, we explain the source 
of our data, present the hypothesis test and explain the statistical test.  In Chapters IV and 
V, we summarize the results of our analysis and provide policy implications based on our 
findings. 
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II:  Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, we expand on the EVM architecture, the historical body of EVM 
research and emphasize CPI characteristics.  Additionally, we define the term OTB, 
discuss the OTB process and emphasize the stated purpose of OTB.         
 
Earned Value Management (EVM) Overview 
 
Since its inception, EVM has been a program management (PM) tool that ties 
cost, schedule and performance into an integrated program baseline; essentially, the EVM 
construct serves as a roadmap of execution and an internal control mechanism to assess 
project status and future completion.  In a memorandum dated 3 Jul 07, USD AT&L 
Kenneth J. Krieg described EVM as a project management best practice that “provides a 
disciplined approach to managing projects successfully through the use of an integrated 
system to plan and control authorized work to achieve cost, schedule and performance 
objectives” (Krieg, 2007).    
Contractor earned value management systems (EVMS) rest on 32 guidelines or 
industry standards established by American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI)/Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA); “the DoD formally adopted ANSI/EIA-748 
in August 1998 for application to major defense acquisition programs” (DCMA, 2006).  
The guidelines are not prescriptive, but give government contractors the flexibility to 
develop business information systems that accurately collect and report acquisition 
program execution data to enable resource decision-making (DCMA, 2006).  OMB 
Circular No. A-11 (OMB A-11), Section 300, establishes policy for planning, budgeting, 
acquisition and management of Federal capital assets “to ensure scarce public resources 
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are wisely invested” (OMB, Jun 08).   OMB A-11 references EVM contract criteria set 
forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).   FAR 7.105(b)(10) discusses EVMS 
performance analysis and calls for EVMS compliance language in written acquisition 
plans.  Further, FAR 34.201and 34.202 mandate EVMS for major development 
acquisition in accordance with agency procedures and ANSI/EIA-748 standards and calls 
for program Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBR) when EVMS is required.  FAR 34.203 
directs the insertion of an EVMS contract clause in solicitations requiring a contractor 
EVMS.  In terms of agency procedures, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) 234.2 and the DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, prescribe mandatory EVM requirements for cost and incentive 
contracts.  These regulations require formal compliance validation of contractor EVMS 
with ANSI/EIA-748 for cost and incentive contracts ≥ $50 million.  Further, for cost and 
incentive contracts from $20-50 million, a formal validation is not required, but 
ANSI/EIA-748 compliance is required.  Finally, for any contract less than $20 million, 
PMs have discretion and can decide whether the cost of an EVMS is justified by its 
benefits (DAU, 2009).   
Beyond the purpose and regulatory requirements, EVM is a simple and useful PM 
tool.  The foundation of EVM is the Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB); Cukr 
describes it well by stating "the purpose of a performance measurement baseline is to 
capture the technical work and performance requirements, the time limitations, and the 
resource constraints of a project in a time-phased, dollarized plan for successfully 
accomplishing the project" (Cukr, 2000).  The importance of an accurate and disciplined 
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PMB cannot be overstated.  The DAU EVM "Gold Card" (Appendix A) provides a 
summary of EVM calculations and terms (DAU, 2009). 
 
 
  Figure 1:  DAU Gold Card, 2009 
 
The PMB, the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) or the Planned Value 
(PV) is the starting point of EVM analysis; "the focus of earned value has been 
consistent: the accurate measurement of physical performance against a detailed plan (or 
PV) to allow for the accurate prediction of the final costs and schedule results for a given 
project" (Fleming, 2000).  As a program executes and data is collected from Contract 
Performance Reports (CPR), the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) or the 
Earned Value (EV) is compared to the Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) or the 
Actual Cost (AC) and the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) or the Planned 
Value (PV)  at "time now" to determine the Cost Variance (CV) and the Schedule 
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Variance (SV), respectively.  These variances, positive or negative, provide program 
managers insight into the current cost and schedule status of the project.  At "time now", 
two performance metrics can be generated by dividing EV by AC and EV by PV.  The 
first calculation, EV/AC, produces the Cost Performance Index (CPI).  The CPI is a "time 
now" metric that measures contractor cost performance.  The second calculation, EV/PV, 
produces the Schedule Performance Index (SPI).  The SPI measures contractor schedule 
performance.  EVM cost analysts and PMs utilize the CPI, the SPI and various 
combinations of the two indices (SCI product and Composite additive weighting) as 
performance factors (Table 2) to calculate a range of Estimates at Completion (EAC).  
 
 Table 2:  EVM Performance Indices (Thickstun, 2010)    
   
  
Once the performance factors are determined and the Budget At Completion 
(BAC) is known, index-based EACs are calculated by adding the AC to the quotient of 
remaining work divided by a selected performance factor (Table 2).  Christensen 
provides an excellent example of EVM's simplicity and utility in calculating a range of 
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EACs.  In the wake of the A-12 cancellation, Christensen developed Tables 3 and 4 to 
demonstrate the utility of the earned value management report (Christensen, 1999).   
 
Table 3 (Christensen, 1999) 
Cost Performance Data for A-12 Program 
(April 1990, Millions of Dollars) 
(See Appendix A for EVM acronym definitions and equations.) 
 
Table 4 (Christensen, 1999) 
A Range of Estimates at Completion for A-12 Program 
(Derived from the Cumulative Performance Data in Table 2) 
 
(See Appendix A for EVM acronym definitions and equations.) 
 
Having calculated the index-based performance factors (Table 4) from the cost 
data (Table 3), Christensen effectively displayed a lower and upper bound range of 
Estimates at Completion (EAC) available to A-12 program leadership (Table 4).  
Christensen‟s example demonstrates the relative simplicity of EVM calculations, but 
highlights its usefulness in decision support.   
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Commenting on the large number of EAC calculation formulas, Fleming and 
Koppelman characterize the cumulative CPI based EAC calculations (Table 4) as "three 
of the more accepted formulas" (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000).   
 
The Cost Performance Index (CPI) 
 
 Characterization of the CPI is particularly important to our research.  Fleming and 
Koppelman characterize the CPI as a “delicate relationship between the value of the work 
physically completed and in process, related to the actual costs incurred for doing such 
work” (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000).  Additionally, the CPI is a generic metric that 
accommodates all types of programs and levels of technical risk and “reflects the health 
of (a) project” (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000).  Regardless of the specific program, the 
CPI highlights cost variance and directs management attention to negative trends.    
By definition, the Cost Performance Index is BCWP/ACWP, the quotient of 
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) divided by the Actual Cost of Work 
Performed (ACWP); the CPI is a measure of cost efficiency or cost performance relating 
Earned Value (EV) to Actual Cost (AC).  Cumulative CPI (CPIcum) relates total EV to 
total AC for “time now”, while CPI in general can relate EV to AC for any defined 
period.   CPI values less than one indicate an unfavorable overrun condition and CPI 
values greater than one indicate a favorable underrun condition.  In a scenario of perfect 
knowledge and perfect execution, the CPI is consistently a value of one.  Figure 2 depicts 
all three scenarios. 
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Figure 2:  Characterization of the Cost Performance Index (CPIcum) 
  
 The CPI provides a great deal of programmatic insight, especially into the PMB‟s 
technical risk.  Recall that the PMB is a “time-phased, dollarized plan” that represents the 
planned technical work packages for a particular program; it is an estimated plan (Cukr, 
2000).  With any estimated plan, there exists risk and uncertainty and that uncertainty is 
reflected in the actual execution of the program.  In a “perfect knowledge” scenario, the 
program produces a capability exactly as planned; the program earns $1 dollar of value 
for every $1 dollar of actual cost.  The program‟s CPI is perfectly constant at a value of 
one (Figure 2) and the cumulative CPI slope is horizontal.  Depicted as the Overrun CPI 
slope, the program that lacks perfect knowledge and estimates optimistically will earn 
less than $1 dollar of value for every $1 dollar of cost.  Conversely and depicted as the 
Underrun CPI slope, the program that lacks perfect knowledge and estimates 
conservatively will earn greater than $1 dollar of earned value per $1 dollar of cost.  CPI 
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directly reflects the cost performance of the program and provides insight into program 
technical risk and/or the quality of the estimating process.  Additionally, the slope of the 
cumulative CPI provides insight into management‟s ability or inability to actively 
improve its cost position and performance. 
 
Historical EVM Research 
 
EVM research centers on EAC prediction methods and cumulative CPI heuristics.  
In a comprehensive review of twenty-five proposed or comparative EAC studies that 
explored index, regression  and other methods, Christensen concluded that “no one 
formula or model is always best” and “the accuracy of index-based formulas depends on 
the type of system, and the stage and phase of the contracts” (Christensen, 1995).  Since 
that time, Tracy examined regression based EAC models and found that regression 
models only outperform index-based models at early stages of completion (Tracy, 2005).  
In 2009 Trahan produced three EAC models using the Gompertz growth curve and 
concluded that growth models, depending on model and phase, are “a more accurate 
estimating tool for identified OTB contract‟s EAC as compared to the CPI, SCI and 
Composite Index methods” (Trahan, 2009).  Noted by Thickstun, these findings add 
further support to Christensen's 1995 research that there is no one EAC method that 
outperforms the others in all situations (Thickstun, 2010).  Further, through logistic 
regression analysis of various OTB program factors, Thickstun attempted to complement 
Trahan‟s research by developing a model to predict OTB contracts.  Thickstun concluded 
that “the ability to predict OTBs was no better than a coin flip” for the data studied and 
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“it suggests that OTBs may occur randomly”; she goes on to question the benefits of the 
OTB process (Thickstun, 2010). 
Within EVM, the CPI is a central index utilized in almost every performance 
factor EAC calculation.  Additionally, CPI research has developed rules of thumb 
(heuristics) that empower PMs to test EAC confidence and understand program stability.  
The following CPI heuristics are particularly useful in evaluating a contractor‟s EAC. 
 “Research has shown that the EAC derived from the CPI is a reasonable floor to 
the final cost” (Christensen, 1996). 
 
 “When the cumulative CPI is significantly less than TCPI, it is highly doubtful 
that the contract will be completed at the EAC” (Christensen, 1999). 
 
 “The smallest and largest EACs were derived from the CPI and the product of the 
CPI and SPI, respectively” (Christensen, 1999). 
 
 
 
The PM‟s ability to improve cost performance is particularly important to our 
research and directly tied to CPI stability.  Concerning DoD cumulative CPI stability, 
defined by Christensen as “cumulative CPI does not change by more than plus or minus 
0.10 from its value at the 20 percent completion point”, the following heuristics are cited. 
 DoD research supports the fact that DoD programs are unable to change their 
cumulative CPI by +/- 10% once the 20% program completion point is achieved 
(Christensen and Payne, 1992). 
 
  “A stable CPI is evidence that the contractor‟s management control systems, 
particularly the planning, budgeting, and accounting systems are functioning 
properly” and “thus indicate that the contractor‟s final costs of authorized work, 
termed „Estimate at Completion,‟ are reliable” (Christensen and Payne, 1992). 
 
 “Knowing that the CPI is stable may help the analyst evaluate the capability of a 
contractor to recover from a cost overrun by comparing the CPI with other key 
indicators”  (Christensen and Payne, 1992). 
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 Cumulative CPI “does not change by more than 10 percent once the contract is 20 
percent complete; in fact, it tends to decrease” (Christensen, 1993). 
 
 “Recoveries from cost overruns on defense contracts are extremely rare, 
especially when the project is more than 20 percent complete” (Christensen, 
1999). 
 
 “Based on an analysis of 155 defense acquisition contracts, Christensen and Heise 
(1993) reported that the range of the cumulative CPI from the 20 percent 
completion point to contract completion was less than 0.20 for every contract. 
This result is usually interpreted to mean that the cumulative CPI does not change 
by more than plus or minus 0.10 from its value at the 20 percent completion point, 
and is used to evaluate the reasonableness of projected cost efficiencies on future 
work” (Christensen and Templin, 2002).  
 
 In 2008, Henderson and Zwikael re-examined CPI stability and found contrary 
evidence inside and outside of the DoD.  In their study of twelve Israeli Hi-Tech projects, 
twenty United Kingdom construction projects and five Australian IT projects for 
cumulative CPI stability, they state "this research does not support the previously 
referenced generalizations that the CPI stability rule has universal applicability for all 
projects utilizing the EVM method" (Henderson, 2008).  Specifically concerning the 
aforementioned international contracts, Henderson and Zwikael found "that (CPI) 
stability is usually achieved very late in the project lifecycle, often later than 80% 
complete for projects in these samples" (Henderson, 2008).   
Further, Henderson cites contradictory evidence within the DoD.  In 1996, 
Michael Popp, U.S. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), conducted a study 
concerning the confidence level of programs not breaching 10% over budget.  To answer 
a question posed by NAVAIR's Program Executive Officer (PEO), Popp and staff 
developed "probability distributions of EAC's (based on Cost Performance Index at 
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Complete (CPI)) based on current CPI and % complete of programs based on history" 
(Popp, 1996).  Simplifying the question, Popp asked, "given a program that has CPI of X 
and a percent complete of Y, what is the most likely finishing CPI" (Popp, 1996).  Popp's 
charts display the correlation of cumulative CPI at a defined range of percent complete to 
final CPI.  By 90-100% complete, the correlation is almost exactly one for all programs.   
The greatest deviation (from the correlation value of one) is seen in the 10-20% 
completion chart.   Using Popp's correlation charts and a +/-10% CPI stability enclosure 
technique, Henderson concludes from Popp's data that "CPI stability was also achieved 
very late in the project lifecycle, often as late as 70-80% completion" and "this finding is 
consistent with late CPI stability findings for the (international) commercial sector" 
(Henderson, 2008).         
The purpose of our research is not to dispute past CPI heuristics, but to inquire 
into PM actions that produce an increase in final cumulative CPI.  At the 10-20% 
complete point, Popp's correlation chart does not display a straight line value of one, 
meaning DoD programs and program managers have the ability to effect final CPI 
change for better or for worse.  Our research utilizes the OTB construct to define a set of 
PM actions to study for its treatment effect on cumulative CPI.     
 In a broader EVM sense, Fleming and Koppelman state that "final forecasted 
results are not necessarily preordained" and "final project results can often be altered, but 
only when aggressive management actions are taken" (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000).  
Consistent with EVM research and having noted several important tradeoff variables, 
Fleming and Koppelman stress that aggressive action, "if taken early," can change project 
outcomes (Fleming and Koppelman).   
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Over Target Baseline (OTB) Overview 
 All of EVM starts with the Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB); the PMB 
is an integrated cost, schedule and performance execution plan.  In terms of changing the 
PMB, Cukr states, “the reasons fall into three major categories:  authorized contract 
changes (negotiated changes and authorized unpriced work), internal replanning, and 
inadequate remaining budget in the contract with a resulting requirement for an OTB”  
(Cukr, 2000).  From a requirements and funding viewpoint, authorized contract changes 
represent requirement growth with commensurate funding growth, internal replanning 
represents a reallocation of existing contract funds to existing contract requirements and 
OTB represents the contractor‟s need for additional funds to perform the unchanged 
contract budget base requirements (Cukr, 2000).   
 In summary, OTB reflects a contractor‟s inability to produce a required capability 
at a specified contracted cost and signifies management‟s decision to establish a new 
EVM Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) “to improve managerial control over 
the execution of the remaining work in a project” (DAU, 2007).  OTB (cost overrun) 
increases Total Allocated Budget (TAB) beyond a constant Contract Budget Base (CBB).   
Before overrun 
Total Allocated Budget (TAB)  
Contract Budget Base (CBB) 
Performance Measurement Baseline 
(PMB) 
Management 
Reserve 
After overrun 
Total Allocated Budget (TAB) 
Contract Budget Base (CBB) Over Target Budget 
Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) Management 
Reserve  
  
Figure 3:  Over Target Baseline (DCMA, 2006) 
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 The OTB process entails ten steps in which the contractor and the customer work 
together to establish a new bottoms-up estimate and integrated plan (PMB) for a 
program‟s remaining work.  The process involves customer approval, consensus on work 
scope, consensus on the master schedule, a collaborative risk analysis and a detailed 
understanding of work packages tied to budget and time constraints at the Control 
Account Manager (CAM) level.  The entire OTB process (Figure 4) aims at regaining 
managerial control of remaining work in terms of cost, schedule and performance.   
 
    
Figure 4:  OTB Process Flow (DAU, 2007) 
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OTB and CPI Interaction 
 During the OTB process, program managers have the choice to remove all or 
some of the EVM variances; typically, elimination of all variances, “is the most common 
form of variance adjustment in an OTB situation” (DAU, 2007).  Cukr states, “this action 
(eliminate variances) makes sense if you consider that the OTB essentially builds the past 
variance trend into the baseline through the contractor‟s estimate, upon which the OTB is 
built” (Cukr, 2000).  In detail, elimination of the cost variance means setting the 
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) equal to the Actual Cost of Work Performed 
(ACWP), which adjusts the cumulative CPI value to one.   
 Adjusting the CPI to one is typical in OTB situations, but not necessary for our 
study.  More generically, our research examines the slope of the cumulative CPI trend 
line (typically a negative slope or growing overrun) and is not necessarily interested in 
the level of the cumulative CPI metric.  To clarify, Figure 5 depicts two CPI trend lines 
of equal slope value post an OTB intervention (OTB at Time Zero). 
 
Figure 5:  CPIcum Trend Adjusted/Unadjusted for Level Post OTB (Equal Slopes) 
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 In contrast to the equal pre- and post-slopes in Figure 5 above and consistent with 
the theory of our research, Figure 6 depicts CPI adjusted and unadjusted for level post 
OTB with a horizontal cumulative CPI slope.  Figure 6 implies that the OTB process has 
positively affected the cumulative CPI slope and the program in question is now 
“perfectly” earning $1 dollar of earned value for every $1 dollar of actual cost regardless 
of CPI level.  The theoretical program, having gone through the OTB process, has rightly 
assessed the remaining work, its associated risks and has properly reprogrammed a 
commensurate amount of funding to the remaining effort. 
 
 
   
Figure 6:  CPIcum Trend Adjusted/Unadjusted for Level Post OTB (Positive Slope Chg.) 
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 This type of pre- and post-OTB analysis is consistent with Cukr‟s direction to 
OTB analysts concerning the elimination of cost and schedule variances as discussed 
above.  Cukr states “as a result (of eliminating past variances), analysts can adjust their 
trend analysis by focusing on the cost and schedule trends since the OTB, and comparing 
pre- and post-OTB” (Cukr, 2000).  Analysts should allow "several months" of reporting 
to occur prior to performing post OTB analysis based on cumulative indices (DAU, 
2007).   Consistent with this guidance, our analysis of post-OTB cumulative CPI slopes 
begins at six months and includes all cumulative CPI points pre-OTB.   
Chapter Summary 
  
 In Chapter II, we reviewed fundamental EVM and OTB concepts to include past 
research and established the relationship between EVM and OTB.  Specifically, we 
discussed OTB's effect on cumulative CPI and characterized cumulative CPI heuristics.  
Historical DoD research supports the validity and importance of index-based EAC 
calculations and displays the value of CPI heuristics in evaluating contractor EACs.  Of 
particular importance to our current study is cumulative CPI stability.  The vast majority 
of DoD research (Christensen et al) finds that cumulative CPI is stable at the 20% 
completion point, meaning that cumulative CPI will not deviate by +/- 10% through 
program completion, but recent research provides evidence against CPI stability with the 
intent of finding program actions that produce progressive cumulative CPI improvement 
(Henderson, 2008).  In Chapter III, we explain the source of our data, provide the 
cumulative CPI slope calculation, present an OTB hypothesis test that examines OTB's 
effect on cumulative CPI slope after OTB and explain the Mann-Whitney Test 
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(nonparametric statistical test).  In Chapters IV and V, we summarize the results of our 
analysis and provide policy implications based on our findings.  
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III:  Data and Methodology 
Data Source 
 
  Consistent with previous EVM research, we utilized cumulative and summary 
EVM reports contained in the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) 
database, retrieved through the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) system, for all DoD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) as our 
source data.  Specifically, we compiled the cumulative and summary EVM reports of all 
DAES-identified OTB contract efforts categorized by appropriation purpose (RDT&E or 
Procurement), service component (Air Force, Army, DoD, Navy) and contract type (Cost 
Plus and Fixed).  To increase data validity, we chose "system-identified" OTB contract 
efforts (OTB date data field populated in DAMIR) as the focus of our study to increase 
assurance that the contractor and customer acknowledged OTB status.  Our decision to 
utilize "system-identified" OTB contract efforts differs from Thickstun's choice to use 
DAU's definition (TAB > CBB) (Thickstun, 2010); the DAES database contained 
instances of TAB exceeding CBB without the OTB data field being populated.  Given the 
fact that this study analyzes an OTB "treatment effect", we chose the more narrow system 
query of OTB occurrences to support the assumption of contractor and customer 
agreement.  Once compiled, we applied four data exclusions to arrive at our final dataset.   
Data Exclusions 
  1.) Data Purification:  The dataset contained duplicate OTB dates, consecutive 
OTB dates and OTB dates greater than one per quarter.  To adjust, we removed duplicate 
dates by sorting chronologically, combined consecutive dates to facilitate study and 
removed OTB date occurrences greater than one per quarter to allow the time necessary 
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to implement the OTB process.  Given the number of steps in the OTB process and 
inexact time definition in literature, we assumed three months as the minimum amount of 
time necessary to implement an OTB.  DCMA states "one to two full accounting periods 
after written authorization to proceed is received should provide the contractor with 
sufficient time to fully implement an OTB/OTS in required reports" (DCMA, 2006).  
Given OTB written approval is required within 30 days and typical accounting periods 
are monthly, the assumption of three months is consistent with the aforementioned 
exclusion.  
   
 2.) Unstable Contract Budget Base (CBB):  Concerning OTB implementation, “it 
is usually best to isolate and separately implement the changes associated with 
reprogramming (OTB)" (DAU, 2007).  As discussed in our literature review, OTB is 
"within-scope" reprogramming, meaning that the contract requirement is unchanged; 
OTB reflects a contractor's inability to produce a defined requirement at a contracted 
cost, namely an overrun.  To control for requirement growth and to ensure we studied 
similar requirements on either side of OTB for treatment effect, we implemented a CBB 
stability rule based on mean CBB.  We excluded all contract efforts that experienced 
CBB change greater than +/-10% of the mean CBB ((Max CBB of effort - Min CBB of 
effort) / Avg CBB of effort).    
 In terms of single-group research design, this exclusion increases internal validity 
by removing an historical threat; if CBB has fluctuated consistently throughout the 
history of the program, this fluctuation of requirement contributes to a diminished effect 
and threatens internal validity (Trochim, 2008).  Essentially, it is important to have a 
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stable or similar requirement on either side of the OTB treatment to measure its 
incremental effect on the cumulative CPI slope.  
     
 3.) Insufficient Reports (Reports count <5):  Including the OTB date, if an OTB 
contract effort had less than five reports (data points), it was excluded for insufficient 
data.  We were unable to calculate a slope before and after OTB. 
   
 4.) Multiple OTBs Removed:  After applying the previous exclusions, only six 
contract efforts contained two or greater OTB occurrences.   Given the small sample size, 
and low percentage of total OTBs studied, we excluded these OTBs from our study.  
Referencing the contractor's understanding of the overrun problem and the contractor's 
ability to produce a valid plan for remaining work, DCMA states that multiple OTBs 
"may indicate significant underlying management problems that should be investigated" 
(DCMA, 2006).  Knowing that second OTBs are problematic, including this data in our 
study would skew our results. 
 
 Table 5 accounts for our data exclusions.  Our final dataset contains 40 contracts, 
with 47 contractual efforts having 47 "system-identified" first OTBs (OTB 1s). 
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Table 5:  OTB Data Exclusion Accounting 
     Data Pull/Exclusion Contracts (C) Efforts (E) OTBs  OTB Delta 
DAMIR/DAES (Nov 09) 2267 3231 n/a n/a 
OTB Initial Data Pull (Nov 09) 177 220 392 n/a 
Exclusion 1:  Data Purification 177 220 318 -74 
Exclusion 2:  Unstable CBB 71 89 143 -175 
Exclusion 3:  Insufficient Reports 40 47 53 -90 
Exclusion 4:  OTB 2s removed 40 47 47 -6 
Final OTB Dataset 40 47 47  n/a 
 
Slope Calculation 
 Since program managers typically adjust cumulative CPI to a level or value of 
one during the OTB process (Figure 6), our test is only concerned with OTB's effect on 
the cumulative CPI slope before and after OTB; essentially, we are looking for a positive 
increase in the cumulative CPI slope.  A positive slope change indicates an improvement 
in management's ability to earn value or otherwise stated, management's ability to reverse 
a progressively growing overrun. 
 We utilized simple linear regression, method of least squares, to calculate the 
slopes pre- and post-OTB.  With the cumulative CPI (continuous variable) on y-axis and 
Time (in months) on the x-axis, we calculated the cumulative CPI slopes for all 47 OTB 
occurrences with the following Least Squares Line equation (McClave, 2008). 
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          (1) 
  
 Given the sum of errors is zero and the sum of squared errors is minimized, 
where (beta zero) is the y-intercept and  (beta one) is the slope of the line 
(McClave, 2008).           
 Additionally, using equation (1), we calculated cumulative CPI slopes for all 47 
OTBs broken out by programmatic factors of appropriation purpose (RDT&E or 
Procurement), service component (Air Force, Army, DoD, Navy) and contract type (Cost 
Plus, Fixed).  Further, we calculated each slope by factor and time period post-OTB.  
Varying time post-OTB, we utilized six post-OTB timeframes to include six, nine, 
twelve, eighteen, twenty-four and all-months.  Consistent with DAU guidance, we 
utilized all pre-OTB cumulative CPI data points to calculate the cumulative CPI slope 
before OTB and varied time after OTB starting at six months (typically two consecutive 
reporting periods) to examine the time effect.  These categorical and time breakouts 
enabled further sensitivity analysis; essentially, we tried to determine if OTB's effect on 
cumulative CPI post-OTB was sensitive to time and/or the noted programmatic factors. 
Hypothesis Test 
 The hypothesis test, performed at the 95% confidence level (alpha 0.05), 
examines OTB's effect on cumulative CPI slope before (b) and after (a) OTB.  More 
specifically, we compare the median (m) location of two population probability 
distributions relating to Cumulative CPI Slopes Before OTB (mb) and Cumulative CPI 
Slopes After OTB (ma).  The Null Hypothesis, Ho (2), states that mb is equal to ma.  The 
Alternative Hypothesis, Ha (3), states that mb is less than ma; since we are testing for a 
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positive change in the cumulative CPI slope after OTB, it is a one-tailed test.  If OTB has 
an effect on the cumulative CPI median slope location, we will reject Ho and conclude 
that Ha is true (median before is statistically less than the median after).  If OTB has no 
effect, we will fail to reject Ho and conclude that Ho is true (median locations are 
statistically equal).    
   
Null Hypothesis (Ho):  mb  =   ma     (2) 
Alternative Hypothesis (Ha):   mb  <  ma     (3) 
     
 The variable of interest, cumulative CPI slope, is a continuous random variable, 
not normally distributed (Figures 7 and 8).  We ran Minitab
®
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
test to determine normality; given a KS value greater than 0.05 (alpha level) and visual 
inspection of the plotted data, we reject the assumption of normality.  Given normality 
fails, we must employ a nonparametric test to compare the median locations.  
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Figure 7:  Normality Test for Cumulative CPI Slopes Before OTB 
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Figure 8:  Normality Test for Cumulative CPI Slopes After OTB 
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Mann-Whitney U-Test 
 "Nonparametric methods (distribution-free tests) focus on the location of the 
probability distribution of the population, rather than on specific parameters of the 
population, such as the mean (hence, the name nonparametrics)" (McClave, 2008).  
Specifically, the Mann-Whitney U-Test utilizes a research design involving two 
independent samples that represent two populations with different median locations 
(Sheskin, 2007).  In our research, the Mann-Whitney U-Test ranks the cumulative CPI 
slopes before and after OTB and calculates a U-statistic to determine if there is a 
significant difference in the median location of the samples tested.   
 In instances where the Minitab
®
 Mann-Whitney test did not produce a p-value, 
the JMP
®
 Wilcoxon Rank Sums "2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation, Prob>|Z|" 
value is halved to calculate a one-tailed p-value.  Concerning the Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
Test, McClave notes "another statistic used for comparing two populations based on 
independent random samples is the Mann-Whitney U-statistic.  The U-statistic is a simple 
function of the rank sums.  It can be shown that the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the 
Mann-Whitney U-test are equivalent" (McClave, 2008).        
 The following assumptions apply to the use of the Mann-Whitney U-Test 
(Sheskin, 2008).  First, the samples must be randomly selected from the population they 
represent (Sheskin, 2008); in 2010, Thickstun found that the occurrence of OTB was in 
fact "random".  Our research pulls these random occurrences from the DAES database 
via DAMIR retrieval.   
 Further, the two samples must be independent.  Not only are the programs 
independent (different capabilities, technical risk, schedule, funding and management, 
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etc...), the slopes before and after OTB are independent for having gone through the OTB 
treatment; "cumulative indices will only reflect the performance since the new baseline 
was implemented" (DAU, 2007).   
 Beyond independence, the variable of interest must be a continuous random 
variable (Sheskin, 2008).  Cumulative CPI slope is a continuous random variable in that 
slope can take on any value and this variable quality mitigates the risk of ranking ties.   
 As a final assumption, Sheskin notes that "the underlying distributions from 
which the samples are derived are identical in shape" (Sheskin, 2008).  Figure 9 depicts 
similarity in shape with the exception of outliers; the Mann-Whitney U-Test adjusts for 
outliers in comparison to other parametric tests. 
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Figure 9:  Similar Distribution Shapes; Cumulative CPI Slopes Before, After OTB 
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 Past researchers utilized the Mann-Whitney U-Test to assess the effectiveness of 
acquisition reform legislature.  Christensen found reform efforts from 1960 to 1999 
ineffective in reducing average cost growth of 20 percent during that timeframe 
(Christensen, 1999).  In 2003, Holbrook "discovered that cost performance for contracts 
completed after reform initiative implementation was no different than cost performance 
on contracts completed before implementation" (Holbrook, 2003).    
 
Chapter Summary 
  
 In Chapter III, we explained the source of our data, provided the cumulative CPI 
slope calculation, presented the hypothesis test and discussed the assumptions of the 
Mann-Whitney U-Test.  Having established the validity of the test and calculations 
performed, we present the results of our statistical tests in Chapter IV and stress our data 
limitations.  In Chapter V, we draw conclusions based on our results, discuss the policy 
implications of our findings and recommend topics of further study.   
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IV:  Results and Analysis 
 
 In Chapter IV, we present the results of our statistical tests, analyze the outcomes 
and discuss our data limitations.  In Chapter V, we conclude with policy implications and 
recommended topics of further study.  
Results  
 To summarize the hypothesis and tests (95% confidence; alpha 0.05), utilizing 
Minitab
®
 Mann-Whitney U-Test and JMP
®
 Wilcoxon Rank Sums, we examine the 
distribution of cumulative CPI slopes before and after OTB for a change in median 
location.  Table 6 summarizes the P-Value results for the number of OTB efforts tested in 
a given time period after OTB and for the factor in question.   Given our data limitations, 
the most reliable results rest in the "All" row.  We performed further sensitivity analysis 
by varying time after OTB by factor, but the results are limited by small sample sizes (n) 
and percentages of the total number of OTB efforts. 
 Concerning table interpretation (Table 6), P-Value is defined as "the observed 
significance level, or p-value, for a specific statistical test is the probability (assuming Ho 
is true) of observing a value of the test statistic that is at least as contradictory to the null 
hypothesis, and supportive of the alternative hypothesis, as the actual one computed from 
the sample data" (McClave, 2008).  Essentially, if the P-Value is less than alpha (0.05), 
we reject Ho and accept Ha; if the P-Value is greater than alpha, we fail to reject Ho. 
Considering our hypothesis and our test procedure, failing to reject Ho means that OTB 
has no effect on changing the median location of the cumulative CPI slopes before and 
after OTB; the median locations are equal (2).  Additionally, the Service factor of "DoD" 
consistently had Insufficient Data Points (IDP); one data point did not enable testing.               
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Table 6:  Results of OTB's Effect on Cumulative CPI Slope After OTB 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
 With the exception of RDTE at +6 months, all p-values (Table 6) are greater than 
alpha (0.05).  Given our results, we fail to reject the Ho (2) and conclude that the median 
location of the cumulative CPI slope distribution before OTB is equal to the median 
location of the cumulative CPI slope distribution after OTB.  OTB treatments have no 
effect on the cumulative CPI slope after OTB.  Further, OTB's effect on the cumulative 
CPI slopes after OTB is not sensitive to time and/or the programmatic factors chosen in 
this study.         
 Borderline significance is noted in the RDTE category at +6 months (p-value of 
0.0414, Table 6), but the size of the sample (n = 8) and limitations of the data do not 
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allow us to confidently reject the Ho and state that OTB has an effect on the Cumulative 
CPI slope after OTB.  Given our data limitations and the skepticism that surrounds early 
CPI index use after OTB, we are not willing to commit a Type I error and incorrectly 
state that "OTB increases the cumulative CPI slope for RDTE contracts". 
 At the 90% confidence level (alpha 0.10), there appears to be significance in the 
rows of RDTE, Army and Cost Plus contracts (Table 6).  Given data limitations, we are 
unwilling to commit a Type I error and state that OTB has an effect.  In percentage of 
total sample, RDTE, Army and Cost Plus represent 19%, 19% and 47%, respectively.  
Again, we have consciously decided to risk a Type II error vs. a Type I error given the 
small percentages and relatively high p-values. 
 Additionally, when comparing "Service" p-values and "Type" contract p-values 
(Table 6), we note large differences between the row factors.  Again, any significance 
that could potentially be drawn from these differences is diminished by small sample size 
and percentages at the factor level and further diminished by our insignificant finding in 
"All".     
 
Limitations 
 
 We summarize our limitations by type risk of statistical error.  Concerning the 
risk of a Type I error (risk of rejecting a true null hypothesis or “incorrectly stating there 
is an effect”), the most obvious limitation is our small sample size of 47 (Table 6).  
Within our table of results, it is apparent that some factor and time intersections have a 
very small percentage of the final dataset, the largest being "Navy" at approximately 
62%.  The majority of factor percentages are less than 26% of the sample total.  The most 
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significant row in Table 6 is the "All" row; it represents all 47 OTBs being tested for 
treatment effect across time and we are unable to reject Ho due to p-values greater than 
0.05 and 0.10.   
 Additionally, concerning the risk of committing a Type I error, we note the small 
percentage of OTB contract efforts being studied within the DAMIR database and within 
the population of system-identified OTB contract efforts (Table 5).  By the numbers, 
approximately 7% of contract efforts maintained in DAMIR are reported as OTB.  After 
necessary exclusions (Table 5), our 47 OTB contract efforts represent approximately 
1.5% of total DAMIR contract efforts and 21% of initially-identified OTB contract 
efforts.   
To summarize the Type I limitations, these are small, purified numbers (Table 5) 
and percentages that support the validity of the test and design; we should have seen an 
effect, but we did not (Table 6).  We are unwilling to conclude that OTB has a borderline 
effect on the cumulative CPI after OTB and risk a Type I error.   
Concerning the limitations surrounding a Type II statistical error (risk of rejecting 
a true alternative hypothesis or “letting an effect go free”), our attention turns to the slope 
data content.   In our research, we studied cumulative CPI data.  The cumulative CPI data 
is historical in nature and based on “time now” totals (EV and AC) from program 
inception.  This quality anchors performance to the past, meaning cumulative CPI is very 
difficult to change.  Our data selection increases the risk of a Type II statistical error, 
meaning that we may have let an “effect go free” by choosing averaged performance 
data.  In Chapter V, we will recommend a within-scope data remedy to address this issue.  
  
  
37 
 
V:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
  OTB is a subset of cost growth.  At the contract effort level, the stated goal of an 
OTB EVM intervention is to gain managerial control of a project's remaining work; for 
any program, in any status, gaining managerial control of remaining work is a worthwhile 
goal.  The OTB process is a bottoms-up, collaborative assessment of remaining work that 
is centered on risk analysis in which cost and schedule variances are typically removed 
and funding is added in excess of the original contract budget base.  The OTB guide 
states, “it is important that the project managers recognize that a robust risk analysis for 
the remaining project has resulted in a realistic schedule and budget baseline…it is now 
more important than ever to have a risk management strategy that encompasses integrated 
risk analysis and risk mitigation” (DAU, 2007). 
Research Questions, Results and Limitations  
 
Our research studied two specific questions concerning OTB's effect on 
cumulative CPI slope after OTB:    
1)  Does the OTB process (treatment) improve the cumulative CPI's rate of 
change (cumulative CPI slope) after OTB? 
2)  Is the cumulative CPI slope after OTB sensitive to time and/or programmatic 
factors to include contract type, military service and the purpose of the appropriation? 
 For the data studied, we find there is no statistically significant change in 
cumulative CPI slope after an OTB intervention; OTB does not gain managerial cost 
control of remaining work with respect to the cumulative CPI slope.  Further, we 
conducted sensitivity analysis to determine if time and programmatic factors affect OTB's 
effect on cumulative CPI.  We find borderline significance in the factors of RDTE, Army 
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and Cost Plus contracts, but given the data limitations, we remain unwilling to state that 
OTB has an effect on gaining managerial control of cost with respect to the cumulative 
CPI slope.  We conclude that OTB does not increase the cumulative CPI slope after OTB. 
 Concerning data limitations, in order to validly utilize the design of our research 
and perform the statistical methods discussed, we excluded a large percentage of OTB 
data from the original data pull (Table 5).  Having utilized only 21% of the OTB data and 
its small percentage of the total contract efforts maintained in DAMIR, we limit our 
finding that OTB has no effect the cumulative CPI slope after OTB.  Additionally 
concerning results presented in Table 6, our "borderline" factor significance is very 
unreliable due to small sample sizes and small percentages of the total OTB contract 
efforts studied.  Consistent with these limitations, we avoid Type I errors by failing to 
reject Ho in all instances.  Finally, our choice to study cumulative CPI dampens our 
ability to see the effect of current management actions and raises our probability of 
making a Type II statistical error; essentially, our cumulative data selection has raised our 
risk of incorrectly stating “no effect.”   
 
Policy Implications  
 
Qualified by our limitations, our research empirically characterizes OTB as 
ineffective in improving cost performance as it relates to improving the cumulative CPI 
slope after OTB.  As such, we recommend disallowing the implementation of a formal 
OTB unless explicitly justified by a more robust and standardized OTB cost/benefit 
analysis.  Per DCMA‟s 2006 EVM implementation guide, once the contractor has 
submitted an OTB request, the customer has 30 days to approve or disapprove the 
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request.  If disapproved, “the PM should provide specific reasons as to why it was denied 
and what is required to obtain approval”; PMs should utilize this approval process to 
require a more stringent cost/benefit analysis of the contractor to justify the OTB 
investment.      
 From the cumulative CPI slope viewpoint, the contractor should not remove 
historical variances, add funding to the existing requirement and continue to overrun the 
program at the same cumulative CPI rate pre- and post-OTB.  The cumulative CPI slope, 
normally a negative slope that denotes a progressively growing overrun, should improve 
for having gone through the OTB process.  At a minimum, we should see some impact 
within the first six months after OTB; this time period mitigates the cumulative CPI data 
anchoring effect.  Further, the contractor‟s justification should include a discussion of 
increasing the cumulative CPI slope after OTB and the difference in estimated overrun 
costs if OTB actions are not taken.     
 Thickstun notes that OTB costs are in addition to TAB; essentially, there 
is an incremental cost of doing OTB business (Thickstun, 2010).  That incremental OTB 
cost should produce a quantifiable return on investment.  The customer PM should be 
able to assess the “impact if OTB is not funded.”  We believe this is a more quantifiable 
way of achieving and justifying an OTB investment.  Cukr states it's "possible just to 
continue" (Cukr, 2000); if not justified, just continue and save the time, the additional 
work, the historical information and the financial resources.   
Future Research 
 
Our research did not quantify the potential cost savings of such a policy decision, 
but future research should attempt to determine potential savings. 
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In terms of disallowing OTB completely, we recommend gathering additional 
evidence of “OTB not increasing CPI slope” within the scope of this study based on 
current period CPR data only, not cumulative.  This approach to data selection will 
provide greater insight into current or more near-term PM actions.  The cumulative data 
is anchored in historical performance, meaning it is very difficult to change and limits our 
finding and correspondingly, the policy implication of disallowing OTB.  However, this 
limitation does not eliminate the recommendation to better justify an OTB investment.     
 Additionally, the acquisition community should identify “treatment”-type 
processes in the acquisition life cycle, perhaps rolling Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBR) 
or EVMS surveillance activities tied to ANSI guidelines, to implement standardized, 
repeatable assessments at the contract level. Obtaining this data in a systematic and 
objective nature will allow the acquisition community to research meaningful 
relationships between program actions and superior contract performance.  Once 
identified, program managers can build their execution plans centered on the most 
effective actions to effect improved cost, schedule and performance outcomes.    
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Appendix A:  DAU EVM 'Gold Card' 
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